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PROSECUTORS WHO INTENTIONALLY BREAK THE LAW
Angela J. Davis*

Editors’ Note: The following article is an excerpt from
Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor
(forthcoming, Oxford University Press 2006) by Angela J.
Davis.

the offenses and the meeting ended without a deal. Soon
thereafter, the prosecutor made good on his threats. The
juvenile case was dismissed, and Brian was charged as an
adult.
I was appointed to represent Brian in adult court. He
immediately told me about the meeting with the prosecutor. I
interviewed his mother, who verified the prosecutor’s threats
and expressed her shock and dismay at what the prosecutor
had done. “Can he get away with that?” she asked. I agreed
that his behavior was unscrupulous, and after consulting with
other lawyers at the Public Defender Service, I decided to file
a motion to dismiss the indictment for prosecutorial
vindictiveness.

Brian was a fifteen-year-old African-American boy
charged in the District of Columbia Juvenile Court with
assault with intent to kill, burglary, and related charges. The
government claimed that Brian and two adult men had
severely beaten an older man during a burglary of his home.
Brian’s adult co-defendants were charged with the same
offenses and faced up to life in prison in adult court, where the
The judge assigned to Brian’s case scheduled a
Office of the United States Attorney for the District of
hearing, and Brian’s mother testified. She described the
Columbia prosecuted them.1 As a juvenile, the Office of the
prosecutor’s threats in great detail, explaining how he had
2
Corporation Counsel prosecuted Brian and he faced a
yelled at Brian and had promised to charge Brian as an adult
maximum punishment of two years in
if he did not corroborate the
the juvenile correctional facility upon
government’s story that he had helped the
The Supreme Court bears
conviction. The Juvenile Court rules
two adults beat and rob the complainant.
protected his anonymity and offered the
The
prosecutor
representing
the
much of the responsibility for
possibility of rehabilitative treatment if
government at the hearing was not the
fostering a culture in which
needed.
same prosecutor who had threatened
prosecutors
feel
free
to
engage
The Assistant U.S. Attorney
Brian. To my surprise, he declined to
in misconduct.
handling the case against the adult cocross-examine Brian’s mother. Instead, he
defendants sought Brian’s assistance in
began to argue, in a very dismissive
their prosecution. He contacted the
manner, that Brian’s mother was lying
assistant corporation counsel in charge of Brian’s case and
and that the threats were never made. The judge interrupted
Brian’s court-appointed attorney to arrange an “off-the-record
the prosecutor’s argument and asked whether he planned to
conversation.” The prosecutor hoped to secure Brian’s
present any evidence. The prosecutor appeared surprised and
cooperation in the prosecution of the adults in exchange for
informed the judge that he would just “make representations”
lenient treatment, including possible dismissal of Brian’s case.
as an officer of the court. This prosecutor apparently believed
During the meeting, the prosecutor questioned Brian about the
that he was not required to present testimony under oath and
events surrounding the assault and burglary. Brian’s attorney
that the judge should simply accept his word to rebut the
and mother were present during the meeting. Brian denied that
testimony of Brian’s mother. When it became clear that the
either he or the adult codefendants had participated in the
judge planned to follow the rules of evidence and only
crimes.
consider the undisputed testimony of Brian’s mother, the
The prosecutor expressed his displeasure with
prosecutor asked if he might have additional time to locate the
Brian’s denials and pressured him to testify that the adults
prosecutor and present his testimony. The judge declined his
were involved. When Brian refused to submit to pressure, the
request.
prosecutor threatened to charge Brian as an adult if he
The hearing ended late on a Friday afternoon, and
declined to testify against the codefendants, warning him that
Brian’s trial was scheduled to begin the following Monday
he could receive a life sentence in an adult prison if convicted
morning. The judge declined to rule on the motion, indicating
in adult court. Brian maintained that he knew nothing about
that she would take the matter under advisement. I warned my
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client and his mother that they should not get their hopes up,
that these motions were rarely granted, and that we should
prepare to start the trial on Monday.
On the following Monday morning, the case was
called and my client and I joined the adult co-defendants and
their lawyers at counsel table. The case had been assigned to
another judge. He looked in my client’s court file and
announced, “Ms. Davis, your client’s case has been
dismissed. There is an order issued by Judge Williams
granting your motion to dismiss the indictment for
prosecutorial vindictiveness.” I was shocked. Although I had
challenged prosecutorial misconduct on many occasions
during my years as a public defender, this was the only time a
judge had granted the relief I had requested.
The prosecutorial vindictiveness in Brian’s case is
just one of the many forms of prosecutorial misconduct and is
by no means the most common. Such misconduct may take
many forms, including:
•

•

•
•
•
•

•

Courtroom misconduct (making
inappropriate or inflammatory comments in
the presence of the jury; introducing or
attempting to introduce inadmissible,
inappropriate or inflammatory evidence;
mischaracterizing the evidence or the facts
of the case to the court or jury; committing
violations pertaining to the selection of the
jury; or making improper closing
arguments);
Mishandling of physical evidence (hiding,
destroying or tampering with evidence, case
files or court records);
Failing to disclose exculpatory evidence;
Threatening, badgering or tampering with
witnesses;
Using false or misleading evidence;
Harassing, displaying bias toward, or having
a vendetta against the defendant or
defendant’s counsel (including selective or
vindictive prosecution, which includes
instances of denial of a speedy trial); and
Improper behavior during grand jury
proceedings.3

Numerous articles and books have been written about the
many forms of prosecutorial misconduct.4
I do not attempt to present a comprehensive
discussion of prosecutorial misconduct in this one article, as
such a task would be impossible in light of the breadth of the
problem. Instead, I attempt to demonstrate that the line
between legal prosecutorial behavior and illegal prosecutorial
17

misconduct is a thin one, and that a number of factors,
including the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and the
prosecutorial culture of power and lack of accountability,
create a climate that fosters misconduct. I focus on Brady
violations – the most common form of misconduct – and
explore how and why prosecutors continue to engage in illegal
behavior with impunity.
The Breadth of the Problem
Much of what passes for legal behavior might in fact
be illegal, but because prosecutorial practices are so rarely
challenged, it is difficult to define the universe of
prosecutorial misconduct. Being so difficult to discover, much
prosecutorial misconduct goes unchallenged, suggesting that
the problem is much more widespread than the many reported
cases of prosecutorial misconduct would indicate. In fact, it
would be almost impossible to determine the extent of
prosecutorial misconduct. As one editorial described the
problem, “It would be like trying to count drivers who speed;
the problem is larger than the number of tickets would
indicate.”5
Much has been written on prosecutorial misconduct
in recent years, but one of the most comprehensive studies was
completed in 2003 by the Center for Public Integrity, a
nonpartisan organization that conducts investigative research
on public policy issues. A team of twenty-one researchers and
writers studied the problem for three years and examined
11,452 cases in which charges of prosecutorial misconduct
were reviewed by appellate court judges. In the majority of
cases, the alleged misconduct was ruled harmless error or was
not addressed by the appellate judges. The Center discovered
that judges found prosecutorial misconduct in over 2,000
cases, in which they dismissed charges, reversed convictions,
or reduced sentences.6 In hundreds of additional cases, judges
believed that the prosecutorial behavior was inappropriate, but
affirmed the convictions under the “harmless error” doctrine.7
The cases investigated by the Center for Public
Integrity only scratch the surface of the issue, the cases in
which prosecutorial misconduct was discovered and litigated.
However, there are many opportunities for prosecutors to
engage in misconduct that are nearly impossible to discover.
Most of the prosecutorial practices that occur behind closed
doors, such as charging and plea bargaining decisions and
grand jury practices, are never revealed to the public. Even
after cases are indicted, defense attorneys are not entitled to
discover what occurred behind the scenes. In the rare cases in
which practices that appear to be illegal are discovered, it is
often impractical to challenge them in light of the Supreme
Court’s pro-prosecution decisions on prosecutorial
misconduct. Of course, there is no opportunity to challenge
any misconduct that may have occurred in the over 95% of all
Criminal Law Brief

criminal cases which result in a guilty plea since defendants
give up most of their appellate rights when they plead guilty.
Why is prosecutorial misconduct so widespread and
how did it reach this stage? The Supreme Court bears much of
the responsibility for fostering a culture in which prosecutors
feel free to engage in misconduct. The Court has shielded
prosecutors from scrutiny in a series of cases that have
narrowly defined the universe of behaviors that constitute
prosecutorial misconduct and the circumstances under which
victims of such behaviors are entitled to relief. These cases
have emboldened prosecutors to engage in misconduct, since
they know that even if their behavior is discovered and
challenged, courts will most likely find the behavior to be
“harmless error.”
The Supreme Court—Fostering a Culture of Misconduct
The Supreme Court is largely responsible for hiding
prosecutorial misconduct from the public by establishing
nearly impossible standards for obtaining the necessary
discovery to seek judicial review.8 Many of the most
damaging forms of misconduct occur behind closed doors.
Inappropriate or unethical charging decisions, intimidating
conversations with witnesses, selective and vindictive
prosecutions, and grand jury abuse all occur in the privacy of
prosecution offices – away from the public and the parties
whose cases are affected by the harmful behavior. As a result
of the Supreme Court’s rulings, prosecutors know that it is
highly unlikely that any of these behaviors will be discovered
by defense attorneys or anyone who might challenge them.9
On the rare occasion when such misconduct is
discovered, judicial review is extremely limited. Under the
harmless error rule, appellate courts affirm convictions if the
evidence supports the defendant’s guilt, even if she did not
receive a fair trial.10 This rule permits, perhaps even
unintentionally encourages, prosecutors to engage in
misconduct during trial with the assurance that so long as the
evidence of the defendant’s guilt is clear, the conviction will
be affirmed.
In addition to its constitutional power to reverse
lower court convictions, the Supreme Court’s supervisory
authority to oversee the implementation of criminal justice
grants the Court powers to regulate lower court procedures.
For example, in McNabb v. United States,11 the Court
concluded that when determining the admissibility of
evidence, it obeys the Constitution, and, under its power of
judicial supervision, formulates “civilized standards of
procedure and evidence.”12 These standards are to be applied
in federal criminal prosecutions, in an effort to deter
governmental misconduct and preserve judicial integrity. The
Court’s standards are satisfied by more than simple
Spring 2006

adherence to due process laws and are derived from
considerations of “evidentiary relevance” and justice.13
In United States v. Russell,14 however, the Supreme
Court drastically curtailed the supervisory power doctrine by
reversing a lower court’s use of the power in a case involving
questionable law enforcement tactics. The Court invoked the
separation of powers doctrine as it warned lower courts not to
meddle in the business of law enforcement. In a further effort
to limit the reach of a federal court’s supervisory power, in
United States v. Hasting,15 the Court held that judges may not
use the supervisory power doctrine to reverse convictions
because of prosecutorial misconduct in cases involving
harmless error.
Civil lawsuits have proven equally ineffective as
remedies for prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court
established a broad rule of absolute immunity from civil
liability for prosecutors in Imbler v. Pachtman.16 This rule
immunizes prosecutors from liability for acts “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”17
The Court expressed concern that prosecutors might be
deterred from zealously pursuing their law enforcement
responsibilities if they faced the possibility of civil liability
and suggested that prosecutorial misconduct should be
referred to state attorney disciplinary authorities.
The Supreme Court’s decision to avoid the problem
and pass it on to state bar authorities has proven totally
ineffective.18 All attorneys, including prosecutors, must abide
by their state’s Code of Professional Responsibility. Attorneys
who violate the Code are subject to various forms of
discipline, including disbarment. However, the Center for
Public Integrity found only 44 cases since 1970 in which
prosecutors faced disciplinary proceedings for misconduct that
infringed upon the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
Examples of such misconduct include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

discovery violations;
improper contact with witnesses, defendants,
judges or jurors;
improper behavior during hearings or trials;
prosecuting cases not supported by probable
cause;
harassing or threatening defendants,
defendants’ lawyers or witnesses;
using improper, false or misleading
evidence;
displaying a lack of diligence or
thoroughness in prosecution; and
making improper public statements about a
pending criminal matter.19

Out of the 44 attorney disciplinary cases:
18

•

•
•
•
•
•

In 7, the court dismissed the complaint or
did not impose a punishment.
In 20, the court imposed a public or private
reprimand or censure.
In 12, the prosecutor’s license to practice
law was suspended.
In 2, the prosecutor was disbarred.
In 1, a period of probation was imposed in
lieu of a harsher punishment.
In 24, the prosecutor was assessed the costs
of the disciplinary proceedings.
In 3, the court remanded the case for further
proceedings.20

For many years, federal prosecutors refused to abide by
state disciplinary rules. In 1989, former Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh issued a memorandum declaring that
federal prosecutors would abide by internal Justice
Department rules rather than the ethical rules of the state in
which they practiced.21 Although this memorandum was
overturned by the Citizens Protection Act of 1998,22 the Act
simply returned prosecutors to the status quo, which has
proven highly ineffective in deterring or punishing
misconduct.
It is not surprising that very few prosecutors are referred
to state disciplinary authorities. In many ways, the
phenomenon brings to mind the old saying, “If you shoot at
the king, you’d better kill him.” Defense attorneys are
hesitant to refer prosecutors to disciplinary authorities because
of the power they wield. Since over 95% of criminal cases
result in guilty pleas,23 every defense attorney knows that her
future clients are at the mercy of the prosecutor, whose
unfettered discretion determines what plea offers will be made
and to whom. Challenging the bar license of an official who
holds all the cards is risky business, especially given the odds
of prevailing. Prosecutors are powerful and often popular,
political figures. Even when referrals are made, bar authorities
frequently decline to recommend serious punishment, as the
statistics from the Center for Public Integrity indicate.24 Thus,
referring prosecutors to state bar authorities has proven to be a
dismal failure.
The Court’s rulings have sent a very clear message to
prosecutors – we will protect your practices from discovery;
when they are discovered, we will make it extremely difficult
for challengers to prevail; and as long as you mount
overwhelming evidence against defendants, we will not
reverse their convictions if you engage in misconduct at trial.
Prosecutors are well aware of these facts, and although they
may not always intentionally set out to engage in misconduct,
the Supreme Court has provided them with a comfort zone
that fosters and perhaps even encourages a culture of
wrongdoing.
19

Brady Violations: Withholding Exculpatory Evidence
The obligation of a prosecutor to reveal favorable,
exculpatory information about a criminal defendant is not only
fair; it is a constitutional requirement. In Brady v. Maryland,25
the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s failure to disclose
evidence favorable to the defendant violated due process
rights when the defendant had requested such information.
The Court expanded this rule in United States v. Agurs,26 and
required prosecutors to turn over exculpatory information to
the defense even in the absence of a request. Professional
ethical and disciplinary rules in each state and the District of
Columbia reiterate and reinforce the duty to turn over
information. The obligation to reveal Brady information is
ongoing and is not excused even if the prosecutor acts in good
faith.
Brady violations are among the most common forms
of prosecutorial misconduct. Because the obligation is
expansive, continuing, and not limited by the good faith
efforts of the prosecutor, great potential for wrongdoing exists.
The failure to provide Brady information can have dire
consequences for the defendant. In capital cases, Brady
violations have resulted in the execution of arguably innocent
persons. At the very least, withholding Brady information can
determine the outcome of a trial.
Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley, staff writers for
the Chicago Tribune conducted a national study of 11,000
cases involving prosecutorial misconduct between the Brady
decision in 1963 and 1999.27 The study revealed widespread,
almost routine, violations of the Brady doctrine by prosecutors
across the country.28 They discovered that since 1963 courts
dismissed homicide convictions against at least 381
defendants because prosecutors either concealed exculpatory
information or presented false evidence.29 Of the 381
defendants, 67 had been sentenced to death.30 Courts
eventually freed approximately 30 of the 67 death row
inmates, including two defendants who were exonerated by
DNA tests.31 One innocent defendant served 26 years before a
court reversed his conviction.32 Armstrong and Possley
suggest that this number represents only a fraction of cases
involving this type of prosecutorial misconduct since the study
only considered cases where courts convicted the defendant of
killing another individual.33 They also reported that the
prosecutors, who engaged in the reported misconduct, were
neither convicted of a crime nor barred from practicing law.34
Another study by Bill Moushey of the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette found similar results.35 In his examination of
over 1500 cases throughout the nation, Moushey discovered
that “prosecutors routinely withhold evidence that might help
prove a defendant innocent.”36 He found that prosecutors
intentionally withheld evidence in hundreds of cases during
Criminal Law Brief

the past decade, but that courts overturned verdicts in only the
most extreme cases.37
Few defense attorneys have the time, resources, or
expertise to conduct massive investigations of prosecution
officials. Nor should the discovery of prosecutorial
misconduct depend on investigative reporting. However, the
current law and practices result in the random and infrequent
discovery of Brady violations. Even when discovered,
remedies for the accused and punishment of the offending
prosecutor are rare and inadequate.

denied, but Banks raised the allegations of Brady violations
again in 1996 in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.51
Prior to an evidentiary hearing on Banks’ motion, the
magistrate judge ordered the prosecutor to turn over the
prosecutor’s trial files.52 Information in the prosecutor’s files,
affidavits signed by Cook and the deputy Sheriff, and
evidence uncovered at the hearing proved extraordinary and
egregious prosecutorial misconduct.53
Hidden in the prosecutor’s file was a 74-page
transcript of Cook’s interrogation by law enforcement officers
and prosecutors.54 During this interrogation, Cook was
Misconduct that Leads to a Death Sentence
coached repeatedly on what to say at trial and how to reconcile
his many inconsistent statements.55 In his affidavit, Cook
Prosecutorial misconduct in any case is reprehensible
stated that he was warned that if he did not conform his
and can lead to the wrongful conviction of the innocent. When
testimony to the state’s evidence, he would “spend the rest of
misconduct occurs in a capital case, however, the stakes are
his life in prison.”56 The deputy sheriff testified at the hearing,
the highest because an innocent person might be sentenced to
and revealed, for the first time, that Farr, the other witness,
death. In fact, prosecutorial misconduct has been discovered
38
was a paid police informant who received $200 for his
in an extraordinary number of capital cases. Although
assistance in Banks’ case.57
various types of misconduct have been
The prosecutor obviously knew
reported in capital cases, a high percentage of
39
that Cook’s testimony had been coached,
these cases, 16 - 19%, involve Brady
It is not surprising that
even scripted, and that Farr was a paid
violations. Delma Banks’ case is one
very
few
prosecutors
are
40
informant. These facts were clearly
example. The misconduct in Banks’ case
referred
to
state
exculpatory and should have been revealed
was so egregious that even the United States
to the defense prior to trial. Furthermore,
disciplinary authorities.
Supreme Court, which had been unreceptive
the prosecutor knew that Cook and Farr
to claims of prosecutorial misconduct in the
In many ways, the
41
committed perjury when they denied these
past, provided relief.
phenomenon brings to
facts under oath during the trial, yet he
In 1980, Texas authorities charged
mind the old saying, “If
allowed these lies to become part of the
Delma Banks with the death of 16-year-old
you
shoot
at
the
king,
record and even based part of his closing
Richard Whitehead. Prior to Banks’ trial, the
argument on
the credibility of both
prosecutor informed Banks’ defense attorney
you’d better kill him.”
witnesses.58
that he had turned over all discoverable
The magistrate judge granted
information.42 In fact, the prosecutor failed to
partial relief after the evidentiary hearing, recommending a
reveal key exculpatory information about two of its primary
writ of habeas corpus as to the death sentence, but not the
witnesses – Charles Cook and Robert Farr. During the trial,
guilty verdict.59 The District Court adopted the magistrate’s
Cook testified that Banks had confessed to killing Whitehead
recommendation, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
and that he saw Banks with blood on his leg and in possession
Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of partial relief to.
of a gun soon after Whitehead’s death.43 On crossBanks.60 In March 2003, just ten minutes before Banks’
examination, Cook denied that he rehearsed his testimony with
scheduled execution by lethal injection and after he had been
law enforcement officials.44 Farr testified during the trial as
45
strapped to the gurney, the Supreme Court issued a stay of
well, and corroborated key aspects of Cook’s testimony.
execution while it decided whether to review Banks’ case.
During Farr’s cross-examination, he denied that law
The Court ultimately decided to hear Banks’ claims
enforcement officials promised him anything in exchange for
46
and overturned his death sentence on February 24, 2004, by a
his testimony. Farr also testified during the penalty phase of
7-2 vote.61 In reversing the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the
Banks’ trial in support of his death sentence.47 Banks was
Supreme Court held that Banks had demonstrated all three
sentenced to death.48
elements of a Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim: “The
Banks filed several post-conviction motions in Texas
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
state courts.49 The Court denied the first two motions on
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that
grounds unrelated to alleged Brady violations, but the third
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either
motion alleged that the prosecutor failed to reveal exculpatory
willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”62
information about Cook and Farr.50 The third motion was
Spring 2006
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The Court used particularly harsh language in criticizing the
prosecutor’s conduct:
“The State here nevertheless urges, in effect,
that “the prosecution can lie and conceal and
the prisoner still has the burden to ...
discover the evidence.”[. . . ]A rule thus
declaring ‘”prosecutor may hide, defendant
must seek,’” is not tenable in a system
constitutionally bound to accord defendants
due process.” 63
The grave injustices in Delma Banks’ case were,
unfortunately, not unusual. Brady violations are very common
in prosecutors’ offices, even violations as egregious as those
in Banks’ case.64 The Supreme Court and lower courts have
affirmed convictions in cases involving similar violations.65
So why did the Court provide relief for Delma Banks? There
are a number of possible explanations.
First, Banks faced death at the hands of the state in a
case where prosecutors deliberately withheld evidence. The
Court has always noted that “death is different”66 and has
provided more protections for defendants facing death than for
others.67 The Supreme Court undoubtedly has been affected by
the growing evidence of innocent people being freed from
death row as a result of DNA evidence and investigative
reporting.68 Its death penalty jurisprudence in recent years
reflects more sensitivity to the rights of death row inmates.69
Second, the Banks case garnered widespread national
attention and support for Banks from an unusual combination
of groups and individuals. One of the amicus briefs for Delma
Banks was submitted by a group of former federal judges,
prosecutors, and public officials, including federal judges John
Gibbons, Timothy Lewis and William Sessions. Sessions is
also a former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Thomas Sullivan, a former United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Illinois, also joined this brief, and the
American Bar Association filed an amicus brief on behalf of
Mr. Banks.
Third, some have speculated that the Supreme Court
has taken umbrage in what it perceives as defiance of its
jurisprudence by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.70
There is certainly language in Banks that lends some credence
to this theory. In Banks, the Court cites and relies upon its
holding in Strickler v. Greene and chides the Fifth Circuit for
ignoring it: “Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals’ per curiam
opinion did not refer to Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119
S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the controlling precedent
on the issue of ‘cause.’”71
Regardless of its reasons, the Court’s holding in
Banks is a welcome departure from its usual deference to
prosecutors. It remains to be seen whether Banks is the
21

beginning of a trend towards holding the fire to prosecutors’
feet or an anomaly attributable to Banks’ death row status at a
time when the death penalty is under particular scrutiny. The
latter characterization is more likely in light of the large body
of Supreme Court jurisprudence that defers to prosecutorial
power and discretion.
Why Prosecutors Escape Punishment
Prosecutors are rarely punished for misconduct, even
when the misconduct causes tremendous harm to its victims.
Unfortunately, Delma Banks’ experience is not uncommon.
The Center for Public Integrity examined over 11,000 cases
involving claims of prosecutorial misconduct during a threeyear period, and these were only the cases that were reviewed
by an appellate court.72 The courts found prosecutorial
misconduct in thousands of theses cases, but affirmed the
convictions based on a finding of “harmless error.”73 In more
than 2,000 cases in which convictions were reversed, charges
ultimately dismissed, or sentences reduced, most of the
prosecutors suffered no consequences and were not held
accountable or even reprimanded for their behavior.74
Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley found the same
lack of punishment and accountability in their 1999 study:
With impunity, prosecutors across the
country have violated their oaths and the
law, committing the worst kinds of
deception in the most serious of cases. . . .
They have prosecuted black men, hiding
evidence the real killers were white. They
have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her
husband committed suicide. They have
prosecuted parents, hiding evidence their
daughter was killed by wild dogs.
They do it to win.
They do it because they won’t get
punished.75
Armstrong and Possley found that a number of the prosecutors
not only totally escaped punishment or even a reprimand, but
advanced in their careers.76 In the 381 cases they examined in
which appellate courts reversed convictions based on either
Brady violations or prosecutors knowingly allowing lying
witnesses to testify, the courts described the behavior in terms
such as “unforgivable,” “intolerable,” “beyond reprehension,”
and “illegal, improper and dishonest.”77 Yet, of those cases:
One was fired, but appealed and was
reinstated with back pay. Another received
an in-house suspension of 30 days. A third
Criminal Law Brief

prosecutor’s law license was suspended for
59 days, but because of other misconduct in
the case. [. . .] Not one received any kind of
public sanction from a state lawyer
disciplinary agency or was convicted of any
crime for hiding evidence or presenting false
evidence, the Tribune found. Two were
indicted, but the charges were dismissed
before trial.78
None of the prosecutors were publicly sanctioned or charged
with a crime. It is unclear whether any were sanctioned by
state bar authorities because these proceedings are not a
matter of public record if the sanction was minor. Several of
the offending prosecutors advanced significantly in their
careers:
In Georgia, George “Buddy” Darden
became a congressman after a court
concluded that he withheld evidence in a
case where seven men, later exonerated,
were convicted of murder and one was
sentenced to death. In New Mexico, Virginia
Ferrara failed to disclose evidence of
another suspect in a murder case. By the
time the conviction was reversed she had
become chief disciplinary counsel for the
New Mexico agency that polices lawyers for
misconduct.79
If state bar authorities are hesitant to bring
disciplinary actions against prosecutors, it is not surprising
that criminal charges are even more infrequent. Yet, much of
prosecutorial misconduct is criminal behavior. When
prosecutors knowingly put witnesses on the stand to testify
falsely, they suborn perjury. Subornation of perjury is a felony
in all fifty states.80 Many Brady violations constitute
obstruction of justice, which is also a felony in some
jurisdictions.81 Prosecutors are not above the law or immune
from prosecution. In fact, as the chief law enforcement
officers, they should be held to the highest standard of
conduct. Yet despite overwhelming evidence that prosecutors
routinely break the law, they are not punished.
One of the rare prosecutions for prosecutorial
misconduct occurred in 1999 in DuPage County, Illinois.82
Three former prosecutors and four sheriff’s deputies were
indicted and tried for various criminal offenses, including
obstruction of justice and subornation of perjury.83 The
charges grew out of allegations that the prosecutors hid
exculpatory evidence and knowingly put witnesses on the
stand to lie under oath in the trial of Rolando Cruz.84 Cruz,
Alejandro Hernandez and Stephen Buckley faced the death
Spring 2006

penalty for the abduction, sexual assault and murder of a 10year-old girl.85 The facts of the case were particularly
gruesome, and there was much pressure to find and convict the
perpetrators.
The prosecutors’ behavior in the Cruz case was
particularly egregious. They hid exculpatory evidence from
defense counsel, including a confession to the crime by a
convicted murderer and forensic reports from several experts
demonstrating that the shoe print in the victim’s home did not
belong to any of the defendants.86 Additionally, the deputies
involved in the case allegedly fabricated an incriminating
statement that they claimed Mr. Cruz made while in jail.87 In
fact, two DuPage sheriff’s investigators and an assistant
Illinois Attorney General were so convinced of wrongdoing by
the prosecutors and deputies that they resigned rather than
support the prosecution of Mr. Cruz.88 Charges against
Buckley were ultimately dismissed, but Cruz and Hernandez
were tried and convicted.89 Their convictions were overturned
and they were tried and convicted a second time, only to have
their convictions reversed again.90 Neither reversal was based
on allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.91 At Cruz’s third
trial, there was overwhelming evidence of perjury by the
sheriff’s deputies, and Cruz was acquitted.92
After Cruz’s acquittal, the Chief Judge of the DuPage
County Circuit Court appointed a special prosecutor to
investigate the sheriff’s deputies.93 The special prosecutor
expanded his investigation to include the prosecutors and
ultimately returned the indictment that led to their trial.94 The
trial received relatively little national coverage, despite its
historic significance. According to Armstrong and Possley,
only six prosecutors in this century have been prosecuted for
the type of misconduct alleged against the Cruz prosecutors.95
Two were convicted of minor misdemeanors and fined $500,
two were acquitted, and charges against the other two were
dismissed before trial.96
All seven of the defendants – the prosecutors and the
sheriff’s deputies – were acquitted of all charges.97 A number
of the jurors spent the better part of the evening of the
acquittal celebrating with the defendants in a local
steakhouse.98 The former prosecutors – Patrick King, Thomas
Knight, and Robert Kilander – went on to pursue successful
legal careers. Patrick King is an assistant United States
Attorney in the Northern District of Illinois.99 Thomas Knight
practices law in the private sector; and Robert Kilander is a
judge in the very court where he faced criminal charges.
Thomas Knight eventually filed a lawsuit against Armstrong,
Possley and the Chicago Tribune.100
Most prosecutors that engage in misconduct not only
escape punishment, but advance in their careers. Paul Howes,
a former United States Attorney in the District of Columbia,
was accused of prosecutorial misconduct on several occasions.
After a two-year investigation of Howes’ behavior, the Justice
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Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility concluded
about the misconduct but dismissed or excused it, indicating a
that Howes had abused the witness stipend system by doling
disturbing support of ignoring the rule of law in the interest of
out excessive payments to cooperating witnesses and their
catching criminals. On the other hand, the public may not
family and friends, who were not witnesses. Acknowledging
endorse prosecutorial misconduct, but may not know how to
that Howes’ behavior constituted criminal conduct,
take action to stop it.103 Even if the prosecutor is an elected
official who may be voted out of office, the next election may
investigators declined to prosecute him, instead agreeing to
be years away when the prosecutorial misconduct may be long
drastically reduce the sentences of the defendants convicted in
forgotten.
the cases in which misconduct was found.101 Howes is now a
partner at the San Diego firm Lerach, Coughlin, Stoia, Geller,
The public may certainly punish prosecutorial
Rudman & Robbins.
misconduct if the offending prosecutor is charged and
Howes’ experience is typical. Cook County, Illinois
exercises his/her right to trial. But these prosecutions are
prosecutors Carol Pearce McCarthy, Kenneth Wadas, and
extremely rare, and the few in this century have not resulted in
Patrick Quinn were all scathingly criticized in appellate
serious punishment. It would be unwise to draw any broad
opinions for misconduct during trial. All three were promoted
conclusions about the general public’s reaction to
102
to supervisor positions, and all three became judges.
prosecutorial misconduct from these few prosecutions,
Why do prosecutors escape
primarily because there have been too few
punishment
for
prosecutorial
prosecutions from which to draw a
When misconduct is neither
misconduct? The responses of the
conclusion, and also because the public
acknowledged nor punished, did not play a role in the outcome of most
Supreme Court, state and federal
disciplinary authorities, and the general
of the cases since most of them never went
the line between acceptable
public provide some insight. The
to trial. The acquittal of the Cruz
behavior and misconduct
Supreme
Court’s
deference
to
prosecutors seems to indicate an
begins to blur.
prosecutors and the harmless error
acceptance of prosecutorial wrongdoing,
doctrine might be attributable to the fact
at least by the jurors who acquitted them.
that the remedy generally sought is
But because there are so many factors that
reversal of a criminal case. The Court’s hesitancy to reverse
affect a jury verdict, in the absence of first-hand information
criminal convictions when there is substantial evidence of a
from the jurors themselves, one cannot know with certainty
defendant’s guilt indicates that it places a higher premium on
what factors or issues led them to acquit.
An informal poll conducted by the Chicago Tribune
affirming convictions than in punishing prosecutors who do
after the publication of its series on prosecutorial misconduct
wrong. In addition, some might argue that reversing a criminal
may offer some guidance on the public’s view of prosecutorial
conviction does not directly or sufficiently punish prosecutors
misconduct. The Tribune posted the following question: “An
for wrongdoing.
investigation by the Chicago Tribune found that prosecutor
State and federal bar authorities rarely punish
misconduct is commonplace in felony cases brought in Cook
prosecutors for the reasons previously mentioned. First, they
County. But Chicago is not alone. Scores of murder
seldom receive formal complaints about prosecutors, because
convictions have been thrown out around the country because
the people most likely to discover the misconduct – defense
of dishonest prosecutions. What do you think should be done
attorneys – fear retaliation from prosecution offices that will
to remedy this situation?” Readers responded as follows:
continue to wield power and exercise considerable discretion
“[Prosecutors] should be prosecuted for their crimes;” “We
in their clients’ cases. Second, even when complaints are
need more effective checks and balances on the unfettered
made, the punishment is light – perhaps because of the
discretion about what and whom to charge. We also need a
deference and respect prosecutors generally receive from the
more certain sanction for those prosecutors found guilty of
legal profession.
fudging or hiding the evidence;” “The first thing to do is
But what about the general public? On the rare
eliminate the immunity that they and our prosecutors, judges,
occasions that the public has been informed about
and other bureaucrats do not deserve . . . At a minimum we
prosecutorial misconduct, there has not been public outcry,
need to raise the standard of proof in order to execute someone
nor have prosecutors been voted out of office for their
accused of murder . . . Last, but not least, prosecutors need to
behavior. The Chicago Tribune and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
be prevented from buying testimony from criminals to help
articles reported egregious behavior by local prosecutors, yet
prosecute others.;” “We need institutional reform;” “Our
these articles did not result in the public taking action against
judicial system as a whole, needs to be overhauled.”104
the offending prosecutors. There are a number of possible
These responses may suggest that, even in cases
reasons for the lack of response. Perhaps members of the
involving serious criminal behavior, the American public
general public did not read the articles. Or they may have read
23
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ultimately wants the laws to be enforced fairly. The poll also
suggests that the lack of public outrage over prosecutorial
misconduct may be a result of lack of information about what
prosecutors do and how they behave.

administration of justice for everyone. They also have the
expertise to institute reforms and the responsibility to
eliminate what has become a shameful epidemic of
misconduct among prosecutors.

The Thin Line

* Angela J. Davis, a professor of Criminal Law and Criminal
Procedure at American University, Washington College of
Law, has written various articles and book chapters on race,
crime and prosecutorial discretion. She worked for 12 years
at the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia,
spending the last 3 years as the Director. She received her
B.A. from Howard University and her J.D. from Harvard
University.

Prosecutors wield incredible power and exercise
broad discretion in the important decisions they make every
day – especially charging and plea-bargaining decisions.
Their decision-making is often arbitrary, hasty, and impulsive,
sometimes resulting in great disparities among similarlysituated defendants and crime victims. Because prosecutors
make these decisions in private without meaningful
supervision or accountability, they are rarely punished when
they engage in misconduct. In fact, they are often rewarded
with promotions and career advancement as long as their
conviction rates remain high. This system produces a cycle of
misconduct that is continually reinforced. It is easier for
prosecutors to secure a conviction when they withhold
exculpatory evidence, and since they suffer no consequences
for withholding it and are rewarded for securing convictions,
they continue the misconduct.
When misconduct is neither acknowledged nor
punished, the line between acceptable behavior and
misconduct begins to blur. Some prosecutors may not actually
realize the illegality of their behavior, especially
inexperienced prosecutors in offices that foster a culture of
winning at any cost. If a prosecution office does not train its
prosecutors to reveal Brady information and otherwise play by
the rules, these prosecutors may unknowingly cross the line
from acceptable to illegal behavior. Even when prosecutors
know their behavior is illegal, the harmless error doctrine and
the absence of meaningful oversight by bar disciplinary
authorities serve to encourage the offending behavior.
Conclusion
When the law is broken by the very people the public
trusts to enforce the law, meaningful action must be taken.
Prosecutorial misconduct is widespread and unchecked, and it
is unlikely that either the courts or the general public will take
action to eliminate it. Prosecutors certainly have not policed
themselves. Thus, the legal profession must take the lead in
instituting meaningful reform that will assure oversight and
strict accountability when prosecutors break the law.
Although criminal lawyers in individual cases may not have
the ability to affect meaningful reform, other lawyers, through
local and national bar associations, should advocate for
legislation and binding professional rules that will be
enforced against wrongdoers. Lawyers have a vested interest
in improving the reputation of the profession and in the fair
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Prosecutorial Misconduct*
Based on a study conducted by the Innocent Project,
evaluating the first 100 cases that were overturned based upon
post-conviction evidence, of the first 70 cases reversed:
• Over 30 of them involved prosecutorial misconduct.
• Over 30 of them involved police misconduct which led
to wrongful convictions.
• Approximately 15 of them involved false witness
testimony.
• 34% of the police misconduct cases involved
suppression of exculpatory evidence. 11%
involved evidence fabrication.
• 37% of the prosecutorial misconduct cases involved
suppression of exculpatory evidence. 25% involved
knowing use of false testimony.
*Innocence Project, at http://www.caught.net/innoc.htm.
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